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The ongoing economic and financial crisis has put public budgets world-wide under 
extraordinary strain. Large public spending packages designed to support domestic consumption and 
the financial sector coincided with sizeable drops of growth and public revenue and resulted in soaring 
public debt in many countries. At the same time, euro area Member States have come under increasing 
scrutiny by financial markets. In fact, differences of government bond yields relative to German bonds 
have increased markedly in euro area members.  
A part of the increase in sovereign spreads can be attributed to rising risk aversion, different 
developments in explicit debt and government liabilities due to potential banking liabilities. Going 
beyond these factors, investors’ expectations regarding the credibility of the commitment of 
governments to ultimately correct unsustainable fiscal policies could be a further central determinant 
of increased sovereign spreads. National fiscal rules could be one way of guiding investors' 
expectations and increasing their trust in governments. In theory, fiscal rules should lower risk premia 
in particular in times of high uncertainty. As fiscal rules reduce the uncertainty regarding the possible 
future paths of fiscal policy, they reduce the uncertainty of investors about the sustainability of public 
finances. This should reduce risk premia demanded by investors. Indeed, several governments in the 
euro area are currently contemplating the introduction of stronger fiscal rules. A legislative proposal to 
strengthen numerical fiscal rules at EU member states’ level has also been made by the European 
Commission on September 29, 2010. 
The present paper investigates whether national numerical fiscal rules can contribute to 
containing the interest required on government bonds. Based on a unique dataset on fiscal governance 
in EU member states, we show that stronger numerical fiscal rules contribute to lower government 
bond spreads, in particular in periods of higher risk aversion of market participants. The legal base 
turns out to be the most important dimension for the perceived effectiveness of the rule. The stronger 
the statutory base establishing national fiscal rules (that may vary between mere party coalition 
agreements and constitutional law), the lower risk premia will be. But also the enforcement 
mechanisms of the rules turn out to be important while the body in charge of the supervision of 
compliance with the fiscal rule appears to be somewhat less important. Our results thus show that rules 
become the more credible to market participants the stronger their binding character is, and the more 
effectively they can be enforced. Moreover, the results point to significant benefits in terms of interest 
rate cost on public debt. 